Independent Directors and Team Production in Japanese Corporate Governance

Abstract

Abstract Independent directors (IDs) in listed Japanese companies have gradually increased with the transplant of the Western model of the monitoring board. In practice, however, IDs act more like the mediating hierarch in team production theory than the agent of the shareholders, albeit with a number of differences from Blair and Stout’s seminal model. Japanese IDs mediate formally and informally, resolving vertical disputes between groups of executives as they contest control of the company. Given the norm of lifetime employment, such vertical disputes are common in Japanese companies and are economically significant, since failure to resolve them can result in destruction of firm-specific human capital. The article explores the scope for mediating hierarchy in Japanese law and corporate governance practice, then develops three case-studies which highlight the role played by IDs. Their practice is shaped by and supports social norms that emphasize the importance of continuity in team production.