Antidumping and Strategic Industrial Policy: Tit-for-Tat Trade Remedies and theChina–X-Ray EquipmentDispute

Abstract

AbstractThis article examines the relationship between antidumping duties and strategic industrial policy. We argue that the dynamic between the two instruments is more complex and elaborate than that offered by the conventional account. We use the recentChina–X-Ray Equipmentdispute as a case study to show that linkage between the two instruments may not be the consequence of a government-led policy but instead a result of firm-driven responses to an industrial policy. This in turn may lead to antidumping tit-for-tat behavior between WTO members. We also analyze how WTO litigation serves as a means to alter the payoff and discuss the implications and unresolved questions that remain following theChina–X-Ray Equipmentruling by the WTO.