The North Korean People's Army and the Party

Abstract

When a revolutionary movement seizes power, a Communist one no less than others, it faces the extra-revolutionary task of establishing a loyal and efficient military organisation to consolidate its conquests. In order to ensure unchallenged loyalty, the leaders of the revolution must, first of all, fill the army with their supporters. In order to secure an efficient phalanx, they are at the same time compelled to professionalise their fighting force. However, in the midst of a profound sociopolitical upheaval, these two objectives are not easily fused into one. The North Korean People's Army (NKPA), however, was in a unique position for its strengthening processes from its foundation in 1945. First of all, the NKPA did not need to fight against well-equipped Japanese forces. Secondly, it did not face such complex problems as the dispersal of enemy officer cadres, the securing of enemy loyalty and sympathy, a Civil War and its aftermath, all of which had caused considerable worries to the Communists in the Soviet Union and China. When absolute loyalty is doubtful, officers' professional qualifications are a dubious asset. The Party can never relax its leadership for the sake of a more professional army.