Abstract
AbstractIn both India and Pakistan, parliament is constitutionally endowed with ‘constituent power’, that is, the power to introduce constitutional amendments via procedures laid down in the constitution itself. Duly promulgated amendments, however, are occasionally struck down when Supreme Court judges see them as violating what the judges themselves define as the ‘essential features’ of each country’s constitutional ‘basic structure’. I trace the migration of basic structure jurisprudence from India to Pakistan, focusing on the ways in which it has elevated the power of judges over that of elected officials in the realm of religion-state relations. Specifically, I highlight the ways in which judicial independence vis-à-vis judicial appointments has been described as an essential feature of each country’s constitution, greatly enhancing the autonomous power of judges to mould constitutional benches that, in turn, define India’s constitutional understanding of secularism and Pakistan’s relationship with Islam.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Reference32 articles.
1. Buddhism, Politics and the Limits of Law
2. ‘Distilling Eligibility and Virtue: Articles 62 and 63 of the Pakistani Constitution’;Rasool;LUMS Law Review,2014
3. ‘Judicial Appointments in Pakistan: Coming Full Circle’;Ijaz;LUMS Law Journal,2014
4. ‘Saying Not What the Constitution is … But What It Should be: Comment on the Judgment on the 18th and 21st Amendments to the Constitution’;Mir;LUMS Law Journal,2015
Cited by
3 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献