Abstract
AbstractCommentators and critics often invoke the metaphor “Charter proofing” to emphasize how much the Charter and judicial review have influenced legislation. This metaphor implies that proposed legislation is evaluated carefully for its consistency with Charter rulings as a condition of passage because decision makers believe legislation should respect judicial interpretations of constitutional norms and/or because they engage in risk-averse behaviour out of self-interest to minimize the likelihood that legislation could subsequently be challenged and declared unconstitutional. However, it is not clear that the federal government is as worried about having legislation declared invalid as many assume. If this is so, federal government responses to the Charter raise an interesting puzzle. The government has both the resources and the institutional capacity to anticipate judicial concerns and integrate judicial norms into legislation to minimize the likelihood of having legislation declared unconstitutional. So why does it not act in a more risk-averse manner at the outset, in order to protect legislation from the possibility of judicial invalidation? This address offers a five-part explanation to this puzzle that emphasizes the significance of political strategizing about risk.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Sociology and Political Science
Cited by
3 articles.
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