Author:
Carlson Erik,Johansson Jens
Abstract
AbstractThe ‘non-identity problem’ raises a well-known challenge to the person-affecting view, according to which an action can be wrong only if it affects someone for the worse. In a recent article, however, Thomas D. Bontly proposes a novel way to solve the non-identity problem in person-affecting terms. Bontly's argument is based on a contrastive causal account of harm. In this response, we argue that Bontly's argument fails even assuming that the contrastive causal account is correct.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Sociology and Political Science,Philosophy
Reference2 articles.
1. Causes, contrasts, and the non-identity problem
2. Future Generations: Further Problems;Parfit;Philosophy and Public Affairs,1982
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. A Simple Analysis of Harm;Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy;2023-03-31
2. Causal Accounts of Harming;Pacific Philosophical Quarterly;2021-09-21