Concurrent trade defense investigations in the EU, the EU's new anti-subsidy practice against China, and the future of both

Abstract

AbstractThe EU's decision to follow in the footsteps of the United States by breaking with its past practice of not applying countervailing duties against Chinese subsidies has left many wondering whether its first imposition of such duties on Coated Fine Paper from China was a watershed moment in EU trade defense history or merely an aberration, and if the former, just how profound of an impact these cases might have in the future. The article examines the key considerations which can aid one in determining the probability of the EU making an anti-subsidy practice against China routine, as well as the extent to which that practice could have a substantial practical impact on duty rates. This examination entails a look at the EU's historical use of the anti-subsidy instrument as a subordinate complement to the anti-dumping instrument, the impact of the EU's adoption of the ‘lesser duty rule’ on concurrent investigations, the way in which the expiration of a key provision in China's Protocol of Accession to the WTO will increase the desirability of the anti-subsidy instrument, as well as a look at how the European Commission might have fallen foul of the SCM Agreement with regard to a few key points.