Abstract
AbstractI will discuss a variety of cases such that the subject's believing truly is somewhat of an accident, but less so than in a Gettier case. In each case, this is because her reasons are not ultimately undefeated full stop, but they are ultimately undefeated with certain qualifications. For example, the subject's reasons might be ultimately defeated considered in themselves but ultimately undefeated considered as a proper part of an inference to the best explanation that is undefeated without qualification. In each section of the paper, I consider different qualifications and show how in each case we get an epistemic standing I call “coach-class knowledge”. First-class knowledge requires justifying reasons that are undefeated without qualification. Coach-class knowledge only requires qualified lack of defeat. I will use this distinction to bring debates over knowledge from falsehood and fake barns to an ecumenical resolution. In both cases, the subject enjoys coach-class rather than first-class knowledge. I will also show that the defeasible reasoning tradition can better account for graded accidental truth than safety theories.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science
Reference112 articles.
1. Justified Belief: Knowledge-First Style;Kelp;Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,2016
2. Warrant Without Truth;Coffman;Synthese,2008
3. Knowledge, Causality, Indefeasibility;Klein;Journal of Philosophy,1976
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Reflective naturalism;Synthese;2023-12-21
2. Luck and Reasons;Episteme;2023-03-24