Abstract
AbstractThe problem of evil is typically presented as a problem – sometimes the problem – facing theistic realists. This article takes no stance on what effect (if any) the existence of evil has on the rationality of theistic belief. Instead, it explores the possibility of using the problem of evil to generate worries for some of those who reject theistic realism. Although this article focuses on the consequences for a particular kind of religious fictionalist, the lessons adduced are intended to have more general application.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Philosophy,Religious studies
Reference18 articles.
1. Religious credence is not factual belief
2. Wittgenstein and Realism
3. Theistic discourse and fictional truth;Le Poidevin;Revue internationale de philosophie,2003
Cited by
6 articles.
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