Abstract
AbstractThis article contends that the integration of humanitarian assistance in efforts to ‘win hearts and minds’ in counter-insurgencies has not been successful, and that the costs, both operational and legal, clearly outweigh any benefits. It demonstrates how such manipulation of humanitarian assistance runs counter to fundamental principles of international humanitarian law. In addition, a growing body of research suggests that the use of short-term aid and relief programmes as part of counter-insurgency has been ineffectual, and that, in places such as Afghanistan, it may even have undermined the overall military goal of defeating insurgents. With the United States and NATO military operations winding down in Afghanistan, it is time for the military and policy-makers reviewing ‘winning hearts and minds’ as a counter-insurgency strategy to draw the lessons and recognize the importance of a neutral and independent space for humanitarian aid.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Law,Sociology and Political Science
Cited by
24 articles.
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