Abstract
Presidents are rightly held responsible for managing the national economy—they exercise substantial discretion over fiscal policy and have the potential for informally influencing monetary policy. At the same time, presidential accomplishments are circumscribed by market forces and institutions at home and overseas, and the complexities of fragmented authority and external constraints make judging performance difficult. I draw on the literature on economic policymaking and on the presidency to explicate a set of criteria for comparing presidential economic policy leadership, construct quantitative indicators of each dimension, and display the results of comparative analyses covering the second half of the twentieth century. The four criteria view presidents from three different vantage points: the separation of powers, focusing on presidents' success at gaining congressional approval for an economic agenda; the public, based on an original compilation of survey data tracking the electorate's evaluation; and the economy, tracing how presidents' policies affect overall prosperity and the distribution of income. Combining information about how crucial audiences have perceived and responded to presidential initiatives, with outcomes in the economy, this approach emphasizes comparison, and thus complements the qualitative depth of narrative approaches.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Political Science and International Relations
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