Are Elections Mechanisms of Authoritarian Stability or Democratization? Evidence from Postcommunist Eurasia

Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, political scientists have radically reexamined the role that elections play in authoritarian contexts. Some argue elections are congruent with authoritarianism and actually help to stabilize non-democratic forms of rule. Others challenge this claim by arguing that elections can function as a mechanism for democratization. We test whether elections have functioned as a mechanism of change or of neo-authoritarian stability in the postcommunist world. We generally find that elections neither promote democracy nor strengthen authoritarianism. However, we do find that in energy-rich states elections promote authoritarianism, though of a somewhat more benign sort. We also find that the mechanisms of electoral participation and competitiveness thought to promote democracy function differently in the postcommunist context and explore this in greater detail through a paired case study of electoral mobilization in Slovakia and Belarus.