A Fresh Look at the Meaning of the Doctrine of Denial of Justice under International Law

Abstract

About four decades ago, an eminent jurist described the doctrine of denial of justice as “l'une des plus anciennes et “l'une des plus mal elucidees du droit international.” Another writer, also noting the persistent confusion over the meaning of the doctrine, suggested that the term denial of justice could as well be removed from the language of international law. Despite such suggestions, the doctrine of denial of justice, whose origin has been traced back to antiquity, has been retained, and international lawyers have constantly attempted to elucidate its meaning. In doing so, however, international lawyers, such as Alwyn Freeman in his classic book on the subject, have, for reasons explained elsewhere, eschewed the attempt to define the term justice as such. They have concentrated mainly upon the conduct that has most frequently been regarded as constituting a denial of justice. Thus, from its origin and development, the term denial of justice may be said to have been used in the following three senses:In its broadest sense, this term [denial of justice] seems to embrace the whole field of State responsibility, and has been applied to all types of wrongful conduct on the part of the State towards aliens. In its narrowest sense, this term has been limited to refusal of a State to grant an alien access to its courts or a failure of a court to pronounce a judgment. In an intermediate sense, the expression “denial of justice” is employed in connection with the improper administration of civil and criminal justice as regards an alien, including denial of access to courts, inadequate procedures, and unjust decisions.