International Law and the Nuclear Arms of the New Damoclès

Abstract

SummaryThe backbone of the legal structure set up to protect us from the use of nuclear weapons, the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is a masterpiece of the art of compromise, came into force in March 1971. More than a hundred countries are now Parties to it. The NPT prohibits the transfer of any type of nuclear explosive devices, or of control over such devices, from nuclear-weapons Parties to non-nuclear weapons Parties. However, the Superpowers never intended to transfer such devices or control to other States; they may still possess nuclear weapons on the territories of their non-nuclear allies if they keep control over such arms. For their part, non-nuclear weapons Parties to the NPT committed themselves not to build, or accept transfer or control over, any type of nuclear explosive devices and, in relation to this commitment, to accept safeguards and verifications by the IAEA. Because of the strong commitments imposed to the non-nuclear Parties, the NPT is often regarded as being discriminatory to those States. The gap between nuclear and non-nuclear Parties could be narrowed if the Superpowers gave more importance to another NPT commitment, whereby they undertook, with the other Parties, to pursue negotiations in good faith for the cessation of the arms race and, eventually, for disarmament. However, the SALT talks have brought us cruise missiles and multiple warheads pursuant to the old concept of balance of nuclear power between the USA and the USSR. Will the new START talks and the negotiations on limiting medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe be more productive? The second Conference of the NPT Parties and the Second United Nations special Session on Disarmament both proved disappointing, since no concrete progress was achieved toward non-proliferation objectives.