Author:
Wilczyński Andrzej,Jakóbik (Krok) Agnieszka,Jakóbik (Krok) Agnieszka,Kołodziej Joanna
Abstract
Stackelberg games are non-symmetric games where one player or specified group of players have the privilege position and make decision before the other players. Such games are used in telecommunication and computational systems for supporting administrative decisions. Recently Stackleberg games became useful also in the systems where security issues are the crucial decision criteria. In this paper authors briefly survey the most popular Stackelberg security game models and provide the analysis of the model properties illustrated in the realistic use cases.
Publisher
National Institute of Telecommunications
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