R&D mode and coordination of green products in sustainable supply chain considering power structures

Abstract

Green product R&D has a significant impact on the sustainable development of the economy and environment, and green product R&D can be carried out by manufacturers, retailers, third-party companies, and enterprise alliances. The decision-making order in the supply chain depends on the power structures, which can affect the choice of the supply chain decision-making. To study the optimal choice of green product R&D mode in different power structures and the influence of power structure on product price, market demand, green level, and enterprise profits, This paper compares five modes including green product R&D by manufacturers, green product R&D by retailers, green product R&D outsourced by manufacturers to third-party companies, green product R&D outsourced by retailers to third-party companies and green product R&D by manufacturers and retailers in the three power structures of manufacturers as core enterprises, retailers as core enterprises, and equal power between manufacturers and retailers to study the selection strategy of green product R&D modes in the sustainable supply chain. The conclusion provides a strategic reference for the selection of green product R&D mode in different power structures. The findings indicate that when manufacturers are core enterprises, retailers’ green product R&D is better than that of manufacturers. When retailers are core enterprises, manufacturers’ green product R&D is better than that of retailers. In the same power structure, manufacturers’ green product R&D is better than outsourcing to third-party companies, retailers’ green product R&D is better than outsourcing to third-party companies, and manufacturers and retailers jointly conduct green product R&D better than manufacturers or retailers alone. When manufacturers and retailers have equal power, the market demand and the product green level are the highest, and the retail price is the lowest. When manufacturers are core enterprises, manufacturers’ profits are the highest. When retailers are core enterprises, retailers’ profits are the highest. Finally, a two-part pricing contract is used to coordinate the optimal selection strategies.