Evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission reduction of Internet enterprises under multiple constraints

Abstract

With the rapid development of information technology, internet enterprises have sprung up, bringing about huge power consumption due to constantly expanding enterprise scale, which in turn leads to significant carbon emissions. Additionally, the large influence of internet enterprises on the public and other businesses makes it particularly necessary to pay attention to their carbon emission reduction efforts. To explore the evolution path and patterns of carbon emission reduction among internet enterprises under the carbon neutrality goal, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model for internet enterprises to enter the carbon emissions trading market based on Externality and Sustainable Development Theories, while considering constraints from the carbon market, financial institutions and the public. The model utilizes Python 3.8.2 software for numerical simulations, aiming to push internet enterprises towards low-carbon development. The research findings indicate that: (1) Carbon emission reduction behavior of internet enterprises exhibits significant externality, and when constraints are weak or incentives are not evident, the motivation for enterprises to reduce carbon emissions is insufficient. (2) The carbon market can effectively promote carbon emission reduction among internet enterprises, and the strategy of entering the carbon market becomes the preferred option for these enterprises gradually. (3) Multiple constraints, including emission reduction costs, penalty for non-compliance, government subsidies, financing costs, opportunity losses, and reputation losses, can force internet enterprises towards low-carbon development.