Abstract
Developing new energy vehicles is vital to promote green development and the harmonious coexistence of humans and nature. It is also the only way to help China move from a significant automobile country to a powerful automobile country. Based on the background of the "recession" of government subsidies and considering the importance of green credit in promoting green and low-carbon transformation, this paper constructs a four-party evolutionary game model that includes government, automotive companies, banks, and consumers to analyze the stability of the strategic choices of various parties in the development process of the new energy vehicle industry. It uses MATLAB simulation tools to analyze the impact of relevant factors on system stability. The research shows that: (1) The government’s subsidy mechanism significantly promotes the development of the new energy vehicle industry. Still, there is a subsidy threshold, beyond which the effect will weaken and quickly bring financial pressure. (2) With the gradual decline of government subsidies, the bank’s green credit policy has a specific policy complementary effect on the decline of government subsidies. (3) Considering that costs and benefits are the main influencing factors for automotive companies and consumers’ strategic choices, the impact of factors such as the punishment of violations, adjustment of subsidy policies, and consumers’ environmental awareness must also be paid attention to.
Funder
Natural Science Foundation of Heilongjiang Province
Soft science Project of Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China
Industry-university Cooperative Education Project of the Ministry of Education of China
Philosophy and Social Sciences Project in Heilongjiang Province
Publisher
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
Reference52 articles.
1. Optimization of Subsidy Policy for New Energy Automobile Industry in China Based on an Integrated Fuzzy-AHP-TOPSIS Methodology;X WANG;Mathematical Problems in Engineering,2019
2. The Prospect of China’s Renewable Automotive Industry Upon Shrinking Subsidies;L S QIU;Frontiers in Energy Research,2021
3. A Game Theoretic Approach for Electric Vehicle Adoption and Policy Decisions under Different Market Structures;A CHAKRABORTY;Journal of the Operational Research Society,2021
4. Diffusion of new energy vehicles under incentive policies of China: Moderating role of market characteristic;Y JIAO;Journal of Cleaner Production,2022
5. Sensitivity of the Nonsubsidized Consumption Promotion Mechanisms of New Energy Vehicles to Potential Consumers’ Purchase Intention;Y LIN;Sustainability,2021
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献