Quantifying the economic effects of different fishery management regimes in two otherwise similar fisheries

Abstract

In the southeast U.S., two very similar fisheries are managed by very different management regimes. In the Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish fishery, all major species are managed by individual transferable quotas (ITQs). The neighboring S. Atlantic Snapper-Grouper fishery continues to be managed by traditional regulations such as vessel trip-limits and closed seasons. Using detailed landings and revenue data from logbooks together with trip-level and annual, vessel-level economic survey data, we develop financial statements for each fishery to estimate cost structures, profits, and resource rent. By comparing the two fisheries from an economic perspective, we illustrate the detrimental effects of the regulatory measures on the S. Atlantic Snapper-Grouper fishery and quantify the difference in economic outcomes, including estimating the difference in resource rent. We find that the choice of fishery management regime shows up as a regime shift in the productivity and profitability of the fisheries. The ITQ fishery generates substantially more resource rents than the traditionally managed fishery; the difference is a large fraction of revenue (~30%). In the S. Atlantic Snapper-Grouper fishery, the potential value of the resource has almost completely dissipated via lower ex-vessel prices and hundreds of thousands of gallons of wasted fuel. Excess use of labor is a lesser issue.