Research on watershed water ecological management and compensation based on evolutionary game

Abstract

Abstract Ecological compensation is an effective way to alleviate watershed water ecological management. Considering the behavior of public participation, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the public, enterprises, and local governments, analyzes the evolutionary stability of the strategic choice of each participant, and discusses the influence of various factors on the strategic choice of the three parties. Combined with regional data, Matlab R2018b is used to simulate and analyze the evolution trend of each subject strategy in the Huaihe River Basin under different situations. The study found that: (1) The government's increase in rewards and punishments has significantly promoted public participation and enterprises' active governance of pollution, but increasing rewards and punishments are not conducive to local governments' own performance of regulatory responsibilities. (2) Increasing the amount of compensation and incentives is an effective way to promote public participation. (3) The sum of reputation gains, reputation losses, and rewards and punishments is greater than the difference between the additional benefits of negative governance and the cost of corporate governance, so as to ensure that enterprises actively control pollution.