1. 1. This is typical of difference philosophy, of which the poststructuralism that emerged in France during the 1960s can be considered another version. See Blattberg, “Loving Wisdom.” Among the major pragmatists, however, I wouldn’t consider Charles Sanders Peirce a philosopher of difference, in contrast to John Dewey. See, for example, Dewey’s “Development of American Pragmatism.”
2. 2. That Williams agrees with Berlin about the divorce between the human and the natural sciences can be derived from Williams, “Consistency and Realism,” where he contrasts conflicts of obligations with conflicts of belief; and Williams, Ethics and the Limits 111–12, 138–40.
3. 3. For Aristotle’s discussion of intellectual error (hamartia) driving tragedy, see Poetics 1453a8–9 14–16.
4. 4. Other works that emphasize the connection between value pluralism and tragedy include Williams, “Ethical Consistency”; Williams, Shame and Necessity chap. 6; Harris, Reason’s Grief; Apfel, Advent of Pluralism chaps. 1, 6–9; Spinner-Halev, Enduring Injustice, esp. 7, 17, 55, 122; and Tessman, Moral Failure, esp. chap. 1.
5. 5. Paul Ricœur would object that this reflects Aeschylus’s impure conception of tragedy (Ricœur, Symbolism of Evil 228–29). And evidently, unlike Kant, Hegel does not limit drama, nor any of the other arts, to aesthetics—as if they were a matter of beauty, say, but not of truth. It is because Hegel assumes that nothing is independent of Spirit, that “the only important thing for a work of art is to present what corresponds with reason and spiritual truth” (Aesthetics 1197). The structure of clashing goods he sees in tragedy, for instance, can be grasped by a “speculative” form of reason that he considers capable of reaching beyond aesthetics to achieve an “absolute” idealism, one that unifies all dimensions of reality (Thibodeau 8–9, 18, 144–45, 178–79).