In Defense of the Basic Argument for Vegetarianism-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

In Defense of the Basic Argument for Vegetarianism

Published:2021-10-01 Issue:2 Volume:11 Page:53-59
ISSN:2156-5414
Container-title:Journal of Animal Ethics
language:en
Short-container-title:

Author:

Simpson James¹

Affiliation:

1. University of Florida

Abstract

Abstract In a recent article, Timothy Hsiao criticizes the basic argument for moral vegetarianism. In this connection, Hsiao offers an interesting, original argument (that I’ll christen Hsiao’s Argument) with the conclusion that human consumption of meat solely for the purposes of nutrition trumps the welfare interests of nonhuman animals. In this article, however, I’ll argue that if Hsiao’s Argument isn’t to be problematically circular, we have very strong grounds for thinking that it is either unsound or invalid. Toward the end of this article, I’ll also show that a slightly modified version of Hsiao’s Argument—that I call Hsiao’s Argument*—fares no better than Hsiao’s Argument. So, the basic argument for moral vegetarianism looks to be in much better shape than Hsiao imagines.

Publisher

University of Illinois Press

Subject

General Earth and Planetary Sciences,General Environmental Science

Link

https://scholarlypublishingcollective.org/uip/jane/article-pdf/11/2/53/1460177/janimalethics.11.2.0053.pdf

Reference20 articles.

1. 1. This argument is adapted from one criticized by Hsiao (2015, p. 278).

2. 2. Defenders of the BAMV include, among others: Engel (2000), Rachels (2004), Norcross (2004), Nobis (2008), and Huemer (2018).

3. 3. Take note that neither scenario involves cruelty to nonhuman animals on Hsiao’s (2015, p. 289–290) view, since Hsiao takes these kind of ends to be morally legitimate (i.e., contribute to our flourishing), and the only harm inflicted on the nonhuman animals is the harm required to achieve the purportedly morally legitimate end.

4. 4. It’s worth briefly commenting on an argument from R. G. Frey (1980) that is similar, in certain respects, to Hsiao’s Argument, but that is unsound for much the same reason that Hsiao’s Argument is unsound. Frey’s Argument is, roughly, that nonhuman animals lack moral interests because they lack language. If nonhuman animals lack moral interests, then they lack moral consideration. Therefore, nonhuman animals lack moral consideration.

5. 5. See note 3.