1. 1. I would like to acknowledge, among the many who have helped me think through the ideas here developed, Jesse Berger, Christian Coseru, Ryan Coyne, Evan Thompson, Nancy Frankenberry, Chris Gamwell, Jay Garfield, Jonathan Gold, Lisa Landoe Hedrick, Kevin Hector, Mike Hogue, Sonam Kachru, Tal Lewis, Matt MacKenzie, Wayne Proudfoot, Michael Raposa, Mark Siderits, and Brook Ziporyn. Special thanks are due to Gary Slater, who contributed in several ways to this realization of ideas first presented in 2019.
2. 2. Dan Arnold, “Can Hartshorne Escape Dharmakīrti? Some Reflections with Implications for the Comparative Philosophy of Religion,” American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 19, no. 1 (1998): 3–33.
3. 3. Dan Arnold, Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Epistemology in South Asian Philosophy of Religion (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Arnold, Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
4. 4. See Mark Siderits, Tom Tillemans, and Arindam Chakrabarti, eds., Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
5. 5. For a development of Mīmāṃsā’s epistemological doctrine, see Arnold, Buddhists, Brahmins, 57-114.