1. 1. Doty went on to note, however, that “in the subtlety of their operation, these neuronal chains are more closely allied to the vagaries of human mentation than to the ineluctability of clocks.”
2. 2. Charles Hartshorne’s independent but coordinated development of this approach extended far beyond Whitehead to the dawn of the twenty-first century and included notable engagements with the sciences of psychology (Hartshorne, PPS) and ornithology (Hartshorne, BS).
3. 3. Although the term “evolutionary epistemology” wasn’t coined until the 1960s by Donald T. Campbell (1974), the early ethologists, particularly Lorenz, had been formulating such a perspective since the 1940s.
4. 4. Harnad elaborates: “Let us not mince words. The difference between something that is and is not conscious is that something’s home in something that’s conscious, something experiencing experiences, feeling feelings, perhaps even, though not necessarily, thinking thoughts. Don’t be lured into details about ‘self-awareness’ and ‘intentionality.‘ If there’s something home in there, something hurting when pinched, then that’s a mind” (164).
5. 5. Thorpe cited in support two other contemporary biologists who adopted a Whiteheadian approach in their work, English zoologist W. E. Agar and Australian evolutionary biologist Charles Birch. He could have also included British experimental embryologist Conrad Waddington, whose effort to look beyond simple linear cause-and-effect actions of single cells and to focus instead on the coordinated embryological and evolutionary effects of large numbers of genes coalescing into various pathways, or “chreods,” in a contoured “epigenetic landscape” was informed by Whitehead’s process metaphysics and especially his notion of “concrescence” (Waddington, Evolution 1–11, “Whitehead”).