Political economists have theorized the structural power of financial actors as a function of their capacity to (threaten) exit. This paper presents evidence to make the argument that the dependence of non-financial firms on outside financing have declined, and thus the exit options of wealth owners and their financial intermediaries. Presenting an alternative theory, this paper argues that financial-sector power is increasingly based not on financing and exit but on control. The argument is developed through an analysis of asset manager capitalism as a historically distinct corporate governance regime. Whereas the control-based dominance of finance capital during the early 20th century was characterized by credit-debt relationships between banks and corporations, today asset managers’ equity holdings dominate; and whereas the shareholder capitalism of the late 20th century was characterized by impatient investors wielding the threat of exit, the power of asset managers in corporate governance is based on their large and illiquid, yet fully diversified shareholdings. Recent evidence suggests that the structural power wielded by asset managers determines corporate governance outcomes on environmental and social issues, influences product market competition, and shifts the macroeconomic policy preferences of the financial sector.