The Concept of the Cognitive Unconscious: Philosophical View

Abstract

The article examines the concept of “cognitive unconscious”, which has become widespread in cognitive science. The author explores the origins of the concept, provides a detailed historical context for the emergence of the problem of the cog­nitive unconscious. He analyzes the prerequisites for the emergence of the problem of the cognitive unconscious, the role of Descartes in this process, the endowment of the unconscious with cognitive independence by Leibniz, the understanding of unconscious cognitive processes and the anticipation of a number of postulates of cognitive theory by Helmholtz. The author shows the relationship between the cognitive unconscious and the more familiar understanding of the unconscious as well as the differences between them. He considers the variety of manifesta­tions, of the cognitive unconscious, analyzes the existing viewpoints on the onto­logical status and power of the cognitive unconscious in modern philosophy and science, and also makes a comparison of processes of conscious and unconscious work with perceived information. The author comes to the conclusion that the cog­nitive unconscious is an auxiliary system parallel to consciousness, and illustrates this conclusion with cases of substitution of an unconscious system for a conscious system, including in cases where the latter fails (as a result of health problems and/or operational interventions). He makes criticisms of the “strong” version of the cognitive unconscious, reviews discussions regarding the role and status of the cognitive unconscious in modern philosophy and cognitive science and the role of consciousness in cognitive processes. Finally, he gives a refined defini­tion of the cognitive unconscious.