Naturalism and the Normativity of Consciousness

Abstract

The paper examines McDowell’s approach to understanding the normative char­acter of conscious experience. The first part of the work clarifies the normativity of rules, meanings of linguistic expressions and the content of mental states. Based on Searle’s theory of intentionality, it is noted in this part that normativity in conscious experience manifests itself primarily in the connection that is found between the content of intentional states and their conditions of satisfaction, in those obligations that are imposed on the subject of these states to act in ac­cord with these conditions of satisfaction. In the second part of the paper, McDowell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s solution of the rule-following prob­lem and the interpretations proposed by his opponents such as S. Kripke and C. Wright are analyzed. Explaining normativity of rule-following, McDowell tries to avoid the extremes of unrestricted Platonism regarding this activity and a skeptical reaction to it, on the one hand, and an attempt to explain this activity causally in naturalistic way that ignores the normativity, on the other hand. The third part of the paper notes that McDowell’s understanding of normativity and the space of reasons is incomplete. The article indicates that for a complete understanding it is required to answer the question: How are the conceptual char­acter of conscious experience and the natural processes occurring in us as repre­sentatives of the animal world related to each other?