A Conflict Tolerant Logic of Explicit Evidence

Abstract

Standard epistemic modal logic is unable to adequately deal with the FrauchigerRenner paradox in quantum physics. We introduce a novel justification logic CTJ, in which the paradox can be formalized without leading to an inconsistency. Still CTJ is strong enough to model traditional epistemic reasoning. Our logic tolerates two different pieces of evidence such that one piece justifies a proposition and the other piece justifies the negation of that proposition. However, our logic disallows one piece of evidence to justify both a proposition and its negation. We present syntax and semantics for CTJ and discuss its basic properties. Then we give an example of epistemic reasoning in CTJ that illustrates how the different principles of CTJ interact. We continue with the formalization of the Frauchiger–Renner thought experiment and discuss it in detail. Further, we add a trust axiom to CTJ and again discuss epistemic reasoning and the paradox in this extended setting.