Abstract
he paper discusses a number of interconnected points concerning negation, truth, validity and the liar paradox. In particular, it discusses an argument for the dialetheic nature of the liar sentence which draws on Dummett’s teleological account of truth. Though one way of formulating this fails, a different way succeeds. The paper then discusses the role of the Principle of Excluded Middle in the argument, and of the thought that truth in a model should be a model of truth.
Publisher
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences
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