Pyrrhonian Scepticism, the Infinite Regress of Reasons, and Ancient Infinitism-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Pyrrhonian Scepticism, the Infinite Regress of Reasons, and Ancient Infinitism

Published:2022-12-31 Issue:2 Volume:10 Page:283-306
ISSN:2196-5102
Container-title:Rhizomata
language:en
Short-container-title:

Author:

Nawar Tamer¹

Affiliation:

1. ICREA and University of Barcelona Faculty of Philosophy Montalegre 6 Barcelona Spain

Abstract

Abstract in this paper, I examine how the Mode of Infinite Regress functions in Pyrrhonian scepticism. I argue that it is used both to generate an infinite regress of reasons and to show that such infinite regresses are epistemically defective. I clarify precisely how this occurs while examining the Mode’s efficaciousness and whether ancient philosophers might have accepted infinite regresses of reasons. I ultimately argue that they would not for reasons which have hitherto not been adequately appreciated and which shed further light on how the Mode of Infinite Regress functions, its efficacy, and the relevant notions of justification at stake.

Publisher

Walter de Gruyter GmbH

Subject

History and Philosophy of Science,Philosophy

Link

https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/rhiz-2022-0016/pdf

Reference37 articles.

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5. – (1992): “Diogenes Laertius IX 61–116: The Philosophy of Pyrrhonism”. In: W. Hasse and H. Temporini (eds): Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II.36.6. Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 4241–4301.