Affiliation:
1. University of Nottingham Department of Philosophy, Humanities Building University of Nottingham United Kingdom
Abstract
AbstractInfinite regress arguments are a powerful tool in Aristotle, but this style of argument has received relatively little attention. Improving our understanding of infinite regress arguments has become pressing since recent scholars have pointed out that it is not clear whether Aristotle’s infinite regress arguments are, in general, effective or indeed what the logical structure of these arguments is. One obvious approach would be to hold that Aristotle takes infinite regress arguments to beper impossibilearguments, which derive an infinite sequence. Due to his finitism, Aristotle then rejects such a sequence as impossible. This paper argues that this obvious approach does not work, even for its most amenable cases. The paper argues instead that infinite regress arguments involve domain-specific infinities, and so there is not a general finitism which underpins infinite regress arguments in Aristotle, but rather domain-specific reasons that there cannot be an infinite number of entities in each domain in which Aristotle invokes an infinite regress argument.
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Philosophy
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