System theory safety analysis of network malfunction in nuclear power plant distributed control systems-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

System theory safety analysis of network malfunction in nuclear power plant distributed control systems

Published:2024-07-24 Issue:4 Volume:89 Page:458-471
ISSN:0932-3902
Container-title:Kerntechnik
language:en
Short-container-title:

Author:

Beini Xiong¹,Jieling Wang¹,Yichun Wu¹,Jiayan Fang¹

Affiliation:

1. College of Energy , 12466 Xiamen University , Xiamen , Fujian 361102 , China

Abstract

Abstract A secure and highly reliable communication network is a crucial component of the distributed control system (DCS) in nuclear power plants (NPPs), particularly for the protection system. However, there have been numerous reported cases of cyber-attacks in the field of nuclear power, and the cybersecurity threats faced by a DCS are increasing. Given that the DCS is a complex integrated system combining computers, communication, and control with a large number of interactions between components and external interferences, traditional linear safety analysis methods fail to meet its requirements. To minimize cybersecurity accidents caused by potential vulnerabilities, it is necessary to conduct systematic safety analysis on DCS cybersecurity accidents in NPPs. Therefore, this paper selected a specific case of cybersecurity accidents in a NPP for abstract modeling and reproduction. The causal analysis based on system theory (CAST) method was applied to conduct an analysis of the accident causes. It can identify existing vulnerabilities and potential factors impacting the safe operation of NPPs, and countermeasures and recommendations can be proposed. The reference for assessing potential risks and devising solutions can be provided for other DCS communication networks.

Funder

the Science and Technology Project of Fujian Province

Publisher

Walter de Gruyter GmbH

Link

https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/kern-2023-0129/pdf

Reference30 articles.

1. Cui, J., Cai, Y., and Wu, Y. (2021). Criticality analysis for safety-critical software in nuclear power plant distributed control system. Kerntechnik 86: 343–352, https://doi.org/10.1515/kern-2021-0027.

2. Dawson, L.A., Muna, A.B., Wheeler, T.A., Turner, P.L., Wyss, G.D., and Gibson, M. (2015). Assessment of the Utility and Efficacy of Hazard Analysis Methods for the Prioritization of Critical Digital Assets for Nuclear Power Cyber Security (No. SAND2015-3576C). Sandia National Lab, Albuquerque, NM, United States.

3. Dilipraj, E. (2019). Supposed cyber attack on kudankulam nuclear infrastructure - a benign reminder of a possibile reality. Cent. Air Power Stud. 129: 1–5.

4. Gong, Y. and Li, Y. (2018). STAMP-based causal analysis of China-Donghuang oil transportation pipeline leakage and explosion accident. J. Loss Prev. Process Ind. 56: 402–413, https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JLP.2018.10.001.

5. Hollnagel, E. (2011). Understanding accidents, or how (Not) to learn from the past. Presentation. University of Southern Denmark, Odense.