Affiliation:
1. Department of Philosophy (emeritus) , Georgetown University , Washington , DC , USA
Abstract
Abstract
After summarizing linguistic evidence against the thesis that actuality terms are indexical, I examine conceptual and epistemological arguments offered in favor of an indexical analysis. I argue that an indexical semantics provides no explanation of how we know what is actually the case, and no grounds for postulating a contingent a priori. Truth in every context, or in every model, does not imply knowledge of the fact a sentence expresses nor how we know it if we do. Moreover, descriptive analyses also predict that ‘I exist in the actual world’ and instances of ‘p ≡ Actually p’ are true in every context.
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