Affiliation:
1. POLSIS , University of Birmingham , Birmingham B15 2TT , UK
Abstract
Abstract
The article compares the failed self-transformation attempt in 1973 in Greece and the actual transition that occurred in 1983 in Turkey. These two cases of regime-initiated transitions to democracy with differing outcomes beg the question: If the 1973 transition in Greece led to a crippled democracy controlled by the military (as in Turkey 10 years later), why was it brought to an abrupt end by the very group that it was supposed to benefit—i.e. the military themselves? The author seeks to answer this question by comparing the position of the Turkish and Greek military in their respective power structures, which produced different regimes (hierarchical in Turkey vs. non-hierarchical in Greece). Moreover, in both cases, the transitions were not perceived as equally benefitting the military—hence the different outcomes, i.e. the failure of the Greek transition and the problematic democracy in Turkey.
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