Privatisation or State Ownership When Labour Market is Unionised?

Author:

Fanti Luciano1,Buccella Domenico2

Affiliation:

1. University of Pisa, Department of Economics and Management, Via Cosimo Ridolfi, 10, I –56124 Pisa (PI), Italy

2. Kozminski University, Department of Economics, Jagiellońska Street, 57/59 – 03301 – Warsaw, Poland

Abstract

Abstract This paper analyses the choice of the bargaining agenda in a public/private unionised monopoly, and investigates whether the traditional higher efficiency of the state ownership of a monopoly holds when the labour market is unionised. First, we find that both a private and public monopoly always adopts a Right-to-Manage agenda. Second, a public firm pays a higher wage. Third, we show that privatisation could ensure a higher social welfare. This rather unexpected result may emerge provided that the Government has a high evaluation of the workers’ welfare, and the union is strong and/or wage aggressive. Therefore, our results suggest that privatisation 1) should be socially preferred depending only on the strength and wage aggressiveness of unions, and 2) rather paradoxically, is preferred when the Government is more careful about workers’ welfare. Our results may have policy implications especially in the post-communist countries, where the debate on privatisation is ubiquitously high and, differently between various countries, Government and unions may oscillate between left- or right-wing, and strength or weakness, respectively.

Publisher

Walter de Gruyter GmbH

Reference37 articles.

1. Andaluz, J. (2011). Validity of the “Principle of Maximum Product Differentiation” in a unionized mixed-duopoly. Journal of Economics, 102 (2), 123–136.

2. Armingeon, K. (2006). Trade Unions and Industrial Relations in Post-Communist Nations. A comparison with established democracies. University of Berne, Department of Political Science, Paper for the Conference of Europeanists, Chicago.

3. Bárcena-Ruiz, J.C., Garzón, M.B. (2009). Relocation and public ownership of firms. Journal of the Japanese and International Economics, 23, 71–85.

4. Booth, A.L. (1995). The Economics of the Trade Union. Cambridge Univ. Press.

5. Brander, J.A., Spencer, B.J. (1988). Unionized oligopoly and international trade policy. Journal of International Economics, 24, 217–234.

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