Author:
Darmon Eric,Le Texier Thomas
Abstract
AbstractShould rights be publicly or privately enforced in the case of digital piracy? The emergence of large-scale anti-piracy laws and the existence of illegal non-monitored channels raise important issues for the design of anti-piracy policies. We study the impact of these demand-side policies in two enforcement settings (namely, public and private enforcement settings) with an outside adoption option for users of an illegal non-monitored channel. Our results show that public enforcement generates higher monitoring and lower price levels, and also higher legal welfare than private enforcement. However, we identify potential conflicts of interest between the legal seller and the social planner when the efficiency of the illegal non-monitored channel is low. Introducing supply-side policies, i.e. policies targeted to suppliers of illegal content, we find that they may have unexpected impacts and can damage legal welfare. We also identify situations in which the two policies are substitutes or complements.
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
Reference35 articles.
1. The Effect of Graduated Response Anti-Piracy Laws on Music Sales: Evidence from an Event Study in France,;The Journal of Industrial Economics,2014
2. Should We Put them in Jail? Copyright Infringement, Penalties and Consumer Behaviour: Insights from Experimental Data,;Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues,2004
3. The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,;Journal of Economic Literature,2000
4. Piracy in a Two-Sided Software Market,;Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Organization,2013
5. Does Copyright Enforcement Encourage Piracy?;The Journal of Industrial Economics,2010
Cited by
7 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献