Sollte die Kritik der reinen Vernunft die Vollständigkeit der Urteilstafel tatsächlich (nur) „vor Augen stellen“? Allgemeine reine Logik und Transzendentalphilosophie in Kants Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe

Abstract

Abstract As Kant shows in A 71–76 of the First Critique, his table of the twelve “logical functions of understanding” (in A 70) is an indispensable extension of a table of four well-known logical functions that we find in a section of the Logic that was “already finished” in Aristotle’s times: The Square of Oppositions. The undisputed completeness of this special table thus warrants the completeness of Kant’s general table as well. Any further philosophical proof of completeness for Kant’s table of judgements as a whole is therefore not necessary at all. And due to the contingency of “kind and number” of human forms of intuition and functions of judgment, such a ‘proof’ would not even be possible according to Kant – and thus it is not a subject (or even a part) of his Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. A concluding evaluation of Kant’s own statements about the proof-structure of the B-Deduction as a whole supports this claim.