Political Domination and Economic Dispossession of Farmers: The Case of Land Acquisition for Special Economic Zones in India

Abstract

Abstract Involuntary acquisition of agricultural land for setting up of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in India benefited the elite at the expense of small farmers who were and are the dominant voting group. Consequently, such policies were met with fierce political resistance by farmer organizations across the country. However, these movements have a mixed record against land acquisition attempts by the state and large corporations. This paper presents a simple model of the political conflict between the elite and small farmers over land acquisition to show how the elite may mobilize resources to ensure that their economic interests are protected even in democracies where they are in electoral minorities. We test the predictions of our model using a new data set compiled on SEZ projects that failed to acquire land because of farmer agitations. We show that factors like inequality in land ownership (class) and hierarchies of caste hinder the ability of small and marginal farmers to successfully organize collective action against land acquisition. Further, the division of votes along caste and ethnic lines also dilutes the potential for successful farmer agitations against land acquisition. Finally, we find that historically marginalized communities also resist land acquisition even when they face greater caste-based discrimination in the traditional village economy.