Die Dichotomie analytisch-synthetisch bei Frege unter Berücksichtigung von Kant

Abstract

Abstract I begin by commenting on Kant’s conception of analytic judgements. I then turn to Frege’s notion of analyticity. I argue that his definition of analytic truth in terms of provability from logical axioms and definitions is incomplete. The requisite analyticity of the logical axioms and the definitions, and accordingly the required justification of acknowledging them as true, must be explained in a non-deductive way. I further argue that analyticity in terms of deductive proof deviates significantly from Kant’s conception of analytic judgements. I conclude with two case studies. The first concerns Frege’s attempted justification of the synthetic nature of the geometrical axioms. The second deals with Hume’s Principle, which in his logicist project Frege must establish as an analytic truth.