Abstract
Abstract
When Aristotle introduces the complete moods, he refers back to the dictum de omni et nullo, a semantic condition for universal affirmations and negations. There recently has been renewed interest in the question whether the dictum validates the assertoric syllogistic. I rehearse evidence that Aristotle provides a mereological semantics for universal affirmations and negations, and note that this semantics entails a nonstandard reading of the dictum, under which the dictum, in the presence of a minimal logical apparatus, indeed validates the assertoric syllogistic. I argue that this mereological validation offers advantages over recent discussions in Morison, Malink, Ebert and Vlasits.
Reference49 articles.
1. Alex. APr. Alexander of Aphrodisias. 1883. Aristotelis Analyticorum priorum librum unum. Ed. M. Wallies. Berlin: Reimer.
2. APr. Aristotle. 1964. Analytica priora. Ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Anderson, A. R. and Belnap, N. D. 1975. Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, vol. I. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
4. Barnes, J. 1990. ‘Logical Form and Logical Matter.’ In A. Alberti (ed.), Logica, Mente et Persona. Florence: Olschki, 7–119.
5. —. 2007. Truth Etc. Oxford: Clarendon Press.