Affiliation:
1. University of Leeds , Woodhouse Lane , Leeds LS2 9JT , London
Abstract
Abstract
Imprecise probabilities (IP) are an increasingly popular way of reasoning about rational credence. However they are subject to an apparent failure to display convincing inductive learning. This paper demonstrates that a small modification to the update rule for IP allows us to overcome this problem, albeit at the cost of satisfying only a weaker concept of coherence.
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