The rule W: Wittgenstein and the concept woman

Abstract

Abstract I address some issues on the concept woman that might illuminate both feminist thought and practice, and the interpretation of Wittgenstein. Using Sonia Sedivy’s New Wittgensteinian approach to accuse Neo-Wittgensteinians and their critics of still being essentialists about the concept art, I point out that Cressida Heyes’ Wittgensteinian anti-anti-essentialism concerning the concept woman is subject to the same accusation. Heyes suggests that, in the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein provides feminist philosophers with a kind of anti-anti-essentialism based on which a dilemma concerning the concept woman can be dismissed. She grounds her anti-anti-essentialism in her reading of Philosophical Investigations as offering feminist philosophers the idea that we can draw the boundaries of the concept woman according to our moral and political purposes. My goal is to call this grounding into question considering the New Wittgensteinian reading, such as Sedivy’s. I suggest that Heyes’ proposal falls prey of the essentialist illusion it tries to escape. I end by enquiring whether this same criticism can be applied to current ameliorative projects concerning the concept woman within so-called conceptual ethics or engineering.