Author:
Bertomeu Juan González,Pellegrina Lucia Dalla,Garoupa Nuno
Abstract
AbstractThis paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Argentina for 1984–2007. The estimated ideal points allow us to focus on political cycles in the Court as well as possible coalitions based on presidential appointments. We find strong evidence to support the existence of such coalitions in some periods (such as President Carlos Menem’s term) but less so in others (including President Néstor Kirchner’s term, a period of swift turnover in the Court due to impeachment processes and resignations). Implications for comparative judicial politics are discussed.
Subject
Law,General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
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