Ein Schuldenerlass als Ende mit Schrecken?

Abstract

Abstract The rising debt-to-GDP ratios of the eurozone member states result not least from the coronavirus crisis. Without external support, especially with regard to Italy, but also for other Mediterranean states, access to the capital market could be seriously threatened in the medium run. The recovery fund ‘Next Generation EU’ likely directs the fundamental structures of the European Union (EU) towards a fiscal union with considerable transfer elements, while the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), which is declared as a monetary policy instrument, is even discussed as a violation of the prohibition of monetary financing. As an alternative, this contribution analyses a debt relief by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), implemented via an EU debt agency. This construction would avoid a negative equity position of the central banks and also enable a legal integration into the EU system. The question remains: What would be the consequences of such a non-recurring step?