Affiliation:
1. Institut für Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin , Berlin , Germany
2. Department of Philosophy , University of South Florida , Tampa , FL , USA
Abstract
Abstract
For Aristotle, animals, by contrast to plants, possess a perceptual soul. However, there is disagreement concerning the point at which the perceptual soul is acquired, for him. On one influential interpretation, Aristotle thinks that the perceptual soul is acquired not during the initial formation of the embryo, but at some later stage of its development. On such interpretations of Aristotle’s view, the newly formed embryo is not yet an actual animal, but a plant-like living being or even inanimate matter. We argue, by contrast, that Aristotle views the embryo, from the very beginning, as an actual animal exercising basic nutritive and perceptual functions. We show that this interpretation is consistent with Aristotle’s views on embryogenesis in the GA, HA, PA, and the Metaphysics.
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Philosophy
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