Affiliation:
1. Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Institut für Philosophie , Norbert-Wollheim-Platz 1, 60629 Frankfurt am Main Germany
Abstract
Abstract
This paper examines the dynamic of belittlement and self-affirmation that is characteristic of hate. It argues that in hate we respond to a belittlement of our feeling of self-worth with an extreme form of self-affirmation which consists in regarding the other as evil and as deserving of being annihilated. Analyzing the origins and causes of hate, I develop a taxonomy of its main forms and distinguish between retributive, normative, malicious, and ideological hate. I show that all forms of hate aim at increasing our feeling of self-worth. This common aim, however, is not always achieved: while retributive and normative hate can lead to an enhancement of one’s feeling of self-worth, in malicious and ideological hate such enhancement remains illusory and subject to self-deception. Finally, I argue that hate can never be morally justified.
Reference30 articles.
1. Allport, G. W. (1954), The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, Mass.
2. Brudholm, T. (2010), Hatred as an attitude, in: Philosophical Papers 39.3, 289–313.
3. Drummond, J. (2017), Anger and indignation, in: Drummond, J., u. Rinoffner-Kreidl, S. (Hg.), Emotional experiences, London, 15–30.
4. Elster, J. (1999), Alchemies of the mind: Rationality and the emotions, New York.
5. Fitness, J., u. Fletcher, G. J. O. (1993), Love, hate, anger and jealousy in close relationships: A prototype and cognitive appraisal analysis, in: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65.5, 942–958.