Author:
Bounie David,François Abel,Van Hove Leo
Abstract
AbstractIn recent years, regulators in various parts of the world have capped interchange fees on debit and credit cards. The justification for the caps rests to a large extent on the argument that these cards have, for certain merchants, become must-take cards rather than “wanna-take cards.” That is, there are merchants who accept payment cards not because they bring net convenience benefits but out of fear of losing profitable business to card-accepting competitors. This paper presents an original approach that allows to quantify, for the first time, the relative importance of the two motivations. We find, for the case of France in 2008, that the must-take phenomenon effectively exists, but that it applies to only 5.8–19.8 percent of the card-accepting merchants and to a mere 3.9–13.5 percent of all retailers.
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
Reference12 articles.
1. The Economics of Two - Sided Markets;Rysman;Journal of Economic Perspectives,2009
2. Determinants of Merchant Participation in Credit Card Payment Schemes of Network Economics;Loke;Review,2007
3. How Consumers Pay : Adoption and Use of Payments and;Schuh;Accounting Finance Research,2013
4. How Do Speed and Security Influence Consumers Payment Behavior;Schuh;Contemporary Economic Policy,2016
5. de Ven The Demand for Deductibles in Private Insurance : A Probit Model with Sample Selection;Van;Health Journal of Econometrics,1981
Cited by
10 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献