The New Form Agency Problem: Cooperation and Circular Agency-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

The New Form Agency Problem: Cooperation and Circular Agency

Published:2023-11-07 Issue:1 Volume:24 Page:97-116
ISSN:1935-1682
Container-title:The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
language:en
Short-container-title:

Author:

Chen Chun-Hung¹,Chen Kuan-Wei²,Chen Yu-Fan³,Lin Chia-Yin⁴

Affiliation:

1. Department of Accounting , Chaoyang University of Technology , 168, Jifeng E. Rd., Wufeng District , Taichung , 413310 Taiwan

2. Doctoral Program in Design, College of Design, National Taipei University of Technology , Taipei , Taiwan

3. Institute of Biomedical Informatics, National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University , Hsinchu , Taiwan

4. Department of Accounting , Chaoyang University of Technology , Taichung , Taiwan

Abstract

Abstract This study explores cooperation in the circular agency problem. In circular agency, an agent has weak power in the face of its principal. This research explores a cooperation mechanism in which three participants simultaneously have the identity of principal and agent, in order to illuminate the power struggle between the board of directors, the external shareholder, and the manager of a company. We use the equilibrium results to explain the phenomenon of cooperation between members of the enterprise in practice. Our results have implications for firm governance.

Publisher

Walter de Gruyter GmbH

Subject

Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous),Economics and Econometrics

Link

https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/bejeap-2022-0188/pdf

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