Affiliation:
1. School of English & Liberal Studies , Seneca College , 1750 Finch Ave. East , Toronto , Ontario , M2J 2X5 , Canada
Abstract
Abstract
The diachronic question of persons deals with personal identity over time: “In virtue of what conditions is a person, P
1, at t
1, the same person, P
2, at t
2?” To answer the question, I suggest expanding the constitution theory from a static definition to a dynamic definition. ‘Life’ is an event and the stream of consciousness is an event too. Reflective self-consciousness—which I take to be definitive of persons—is an event. Persons are irreducible constituted events who remain the same through time while they undergo change. This idea faces neither the problem of substance dualism nor the fission problem.
Reference23 articles.
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4. Baker, L. R. 2012. “Personal Identity: A Not-So-Simple Simple View.” In Personal Identity: Simple or Complex, edited by G. Gasser, and M. Stepahn, 179–91. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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