Affiliation:
1. Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz , Mainz , Germany
Abstract
Abstract
In Chapter 8 of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics, one of Gabriele Gava’s aims is to argue that Kant’s critique of Wolff’s dogmatic method has two levels: one directed against Wolff’s metaphilosophical views and one attacking his actual procedures of argument. After providing a brief summary of the main claims Gava makes in Chapter 8 of his book, in this paper I argue two things. First, I argue against Gava’s claim that the two forms of dogmatism he distinguishes between are incompatible. Second, I suggest, contrary to Gava, that Kant’s critique of these two forms of dogmatism both operate on the metaphilosophical level in the sense that they both target the dogmatist’s beliefs or theory about the method they take themselves to be following.
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